Category: cryptography

Sovereign Cryptography and the Strategic Evolution of the Guomi Suite: A Technical Analysis of SM3 and SM4

Sovereign Cryptography and the Strategic Evolution of the Guomi Suite: A Technical Analysis of SM3 and SM4

The global transition toward decentralised and sovereign cryptographic standards represents one of the most significant shifts in the history of information security. For decades, the international community relied almost exclusively on a handful of standards, primarily those vetted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United States. However, the emergence of the ShāngMì (SM) series, collectively known as the Guomi suite, has fundamentally altered this landscape.1 These Chinese national standards, including the SM2 public-key algorithm, the SM3 hash function, and the SM4 block cypher, were initially developed to secure domestic critical infrastructure but have since achieved international recognition through ISO/IEC standardisation and integration into global protocols like TLS 1.3.2

Following my 2023 article on SM2 Public Key Encryption, this follow-on provides a technical evaluation of the Guomi suite, focusing on the architectural nuances of SM3 and SM4. And considering I have spent the last 24 months under the tutelage of some of the finest Cryptographers and Infosec Practioners in the world at the ISG, Royal Holloway, University of London, this one should be more grounded and informative.

I have tried to analyse the computational efficiency, keyspace resilience, and the strategic importance of “cover-time.” This report examines why these algorithms are increasingly viewed as viable, and in some contexts superior, alternatives to Western counterparts like SHA-256 and AES. Furthermore, it situates these technical developments within the broader geopolitical context of cryptographic sovereignty, exploring the drive for independent verification without ideological bias.

Technical Architecture of the SM3 Hashing Algorithm

The SM3 cryptographic hash algorithm, standardised as ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, is a robust 256-bit hash function designed for high-security commercial applications.3 Built upon the classic Merkle-Damgård construction, it shares structural similarities with the SHA-2 family but introduces specific innovations in its compression function and message expansion logic that significantly improve its resistance to collision and preimage attacks.6

Iteration Compression and Message Expansion

SM3 processes input messages of length bits through an iterative compression process. The message is first padded to a length that is a multiple of 512 bits. Specifically, the padding involves appending a “1” bit, followed by zero bits, where is the smallest non-negative integer satisfying .6 Finally, a 64-bit representation of the original message length is appended.6

The padded message is divided into 512-bit blocks . For each block, a message expansion process generates 132 words ( and ).3 This expansion is more complex than that of SHA-256, utilizing a permutation function to enhance nonlinearity and bit-diffusion.6

The expansion logic for a message block is defined as follows:

  1. Divide into 16 words .
  2. For to :
  3. For to :

    3

This expanded word set is then processed through a 64-round compression function utilising eight 32-bit registers ( through ). The compression function employs two sets of Boolean functions, and , which vary depending on the round number.3

Round Range (j)FFj​(X,Y,Z)GGj​(X,Y,Z)Constant Tj​
0x79cc4519
0x7a879d8a

The split in logic between the first 16 rounds and the subsequent 48 rounds is a strategic defence against bit-tracing. The initial rounds rely on pure XOR operations to prevent linear attacks, while the later rounds introduce nonlinear operations to ensure high diffusion and resistance to differential cryptanalysis.6

Performance and Computational Efficiency

While SM3 is structurally similar to SHA-256, its “Davies-Meyer” construction utilises XOR for chaining values, whereas SHA-256 uses modular addition.8 This architectural choice, combined with the more complex message expansion, historically led to the perception that SM3 is slower in software.8 However, contemporary performance evaluations on modern hardware present a different narrative. Research into GPU-accelerated hash operations, specifically the HI-SM3 framework, shows that SM3 can achieve remarkable throughput when parallelism is properly leveraged. On high-end NVIDIA hardware, SM3 has reached peak performance of 454.74 GB/s, outperforming server-class CPUs by over 150 times.11 Even on lower-power embedded GPUs, SM3 has demonstrated a throughput of 5.90 GB/s.11 This suggests that the complexity of the SM3 compression function is well-suited for high-throughput environments such as blockchain validation and large-scale data integrity verification, where GPU offloading is available.7

The SM4 Block Cipher: Robustness and Symmetric Efficiency

SM4 (formerly SMS4) is the first commercial block cipher published by the Chinese State Cryptography Administration in 2006.2 It operates on 128-bit blocks using a 128-bit key, positioning it as the primary alternative to AES-128.2 Unlike the Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) structure of AES, SM4 utilizes an unbalanced Feistel structure, where the encryption and decryption processes are identical, differing only in the sequence of round keys.2

Round Function and Key Schedule

The SM4 algorithm consists of 32 identical rounds. Each round takes four 32-bit words as input and uses a round key to produce a new word.14 The round function involves a nonlinear substitution step (S-box) and a linear transformation .2

The substitution function is defined by:

where is the nonlinear S-box transformation, applying four independent 8-bit S-boxes in parallel.16 The S-box is constructed via a multiplicative inverse over the finite field , followed by an affine transformation.2

A critical advantage of the Feistel structure in SM4 is the elimination of the need for an inverse S-box during decryption.16 In AES, hardware implementations must account for both the S-box and its inverse, increasing gate counts.16 SM4’s symmetric round structure allows for more compact hardware designs, which is particularly beneficial for resource-constrained IoT devices and smart cards.2

Algebraic Attack Resistance

One of the most compelling arguments for SM4’s superiority in certain security contexts is its resistance to algebraic attacks. Studies comparing the computational complexities of algebraic attacks (such as the XL algorithm) against SM4 and AES suggest that SM4 is significantly more robust.20 This robustness is derived from the complexity of its key schedule and the overdefined systems of quadratic equations it produces. 20

AlgorithmKey VariablesIntermediate VariablesEqns (Enc)Eqns (Key)Complexity
AES320128089602240 (Baseline)
SM41024102471687168Higher than AES

The SM4 key schedule utilises nonlinear word rotations and S-box lookups, creating a highly complex relationship between the master key and the round keys.16 This makes the system of equations representing the cipher more difficult to solve than the relatively linear key expansion used in AES-128.20

SM2 and the Parallelism of Elliptic Curve Standards

Asymmetric cryptography is essential for key exchange and digital signatures. The SM2 standard is an elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) based on 256-bit prime fields, authorized for core, ordinary, and commercial use in China.21 While Western systems often default to NIST P-256 (secp256r1), SM2 provides a state-verified alternative that addresses concerns regarding parameter generation and “backdoor” potential in special-form curves.22

Curve Parameters and Design Philosophies

NIST curves are designed for maximum efficiency, utilizing quasi-Mersenne primes that facilitate fast modular reduction.26 However, the method used to select NIST parameters has faced criticism for a lack of transparency, leading to the development of “random” curves like the Brainpool series, which prioritize verifiable randomness at the cost of performance.25

SM2 occupies a strategic middle ground. It recommends a specific 256-bit curve but follows a design philosophy that aligns with the need for national security verification.22

ParameterSM2 (GB/T 32918.1-2016)NIST P-256 (FIPS 186-4)
p0xFFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 00000000 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF2^256 – 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 – 1
a0xFFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 00000000 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFCp – 3
b0x28E9FA9E 9D9F5E34 4D5A9E4B CF6509A7 F39789F5 15AB8F92 DDBCBD41 4D940E93(Pseudo-random seed derivative)
n0xFFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 7203DF6B 21C6052B 53BBF409 39D54123(Prime order of base point)
h11

The performance of SM2 is highly competitive with ECDSA. In optimised 8-bit implementations, SM2 scalar multiplication has set speed records, outperforming even the NIST P-192 curve in certain conditions.19 Against the traditional RSA algorithm, SM2 offers a significant efficiency gain; a 256-bit SM2 key provides security equivalent to a 3072-bit RSA key while requiring far less computational power for key generation and signature operations.21

Verification and Trust in ECC

The core of the “better option” argument for SM2 lies in trust and diversity. If a vulnerability were discovered in the specific mathematical form of NIST-recommended curves, the entire global financial and communication infrastructure could be at risk.24 By maintaining an independent, state-verified standard, the Guomi suite ensures cryptographic diversity, preventing a single point of failure in the global security ecosystem.32 This is particularly relevant as the community evaluates “nothing-up-my-sleeve” numbers; SM2 provides a layer of assurance for those who prefer an alternative to NIST-vetted parameters. 22

Security Metrics: Keyspace, Work Factor, and Cover Time

The strength of any cryptographic system is measured not only by its mathematical complexity but also by its practical resistance to brute-force and analytical attacks over time. Three key concepts are central to this evaluation: keyspace, work factor, and cover time.

Keyspace and Brute-Force Resilience

The keyspace of SM4 is , which is identical to AES-128.2 In today’s computational environment, cracking a 128-bit key through brute force is infeasible, requiring trillions of years on the most powerful existing supercomputers.35 While AES-256 offers a larger keyspace, the 128-bit security level remains the global benchmark for standard commercial encryption.35

SM3, with its 256-bit output, provides a security margin of 128 bits against collision attacks, which is equivalent to SHA-256.37 The “work factor”—the estimate of effort or time needed for an adversary to overcome a protective measure—is a function of this keyspace and the specific algorithmic efficiency of the attack method.39

The Critical Dimension of Cover Time

“Cover time” refers to the duration for which a plaintext must be kept secret.41 This metric is vital because all ciphers (excluding one-time pads) are theoretically breakable given enough time and energy.43

  • Tactical Cover Time: For time-critical data, such as a command to launch a missile, the cover time might only be a few minutes. If an algorithm protects the data for an hour, it is sufficient. 42
  • Strategic Cover Time: For financial records or diplomatic communications, the cover time may be 6 years or more.44

The concept of cover time is now being re-evaluated through the lens of “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” (HNDL).33 Adversaries are currently collecting encrypted traffic with the intention of decrypting it once cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQC) arrive, a date often referred to as “Q-Day”.33 If the cover time of a piece of data exceeds the time remaining until Q-Day, that data is already effectively compromised if intercepted today.45The SM-series algorithms contribute to a longer cover time by providing resistance to classical analytical breakthroughs. Because SM3 and SM4 possess distinct internal designs from the MD4/MD5 lineage and SPN-based ciphers, they offer a hedge against “all-eggs-in-one-basket” scenarios where a new mathematical attack might break one family of algorithms but not another. 32

The Geopolitics of Independent Cryptographic Standards

The development of the Guomi suite is a manifestation of “Cryptographic Sovereignty”—a nation’s ability to govern, secure, and assert authority over its digital environment without overreliance on foreign technology.47 This move is motivated by the desire for technological autonomy and the belief that commercial readiness should precede international policy enforcement.32

Sovereignty versus Autonomy

In the context of modern state power, digital sovereignty extends beyond physical borders into the informational domain.48 For many nations, relying on the encryption standards of a geopolitical rival is seen as a strategic vulnerability. The 2013 revelations regarding NIST standards and potential backdoors served as a wake-up call, accelerating the global drive toward national encryption algorithms.1

  • Chinese Context: The 2020 Cryptography Law of the People’s Republic of China distinguishes between core, ordinary, and commercial cryptography.15 It mandates the use of SM-series algorithms for critical information infrastructure and commercial data, ensuring that national algorithms protect national secrets.47

Global Impact: This mandate has fundamentally impacted global supply chains. Multinational entities operating in China must implement TLS 1.3 with SM2, SM3, and SM4 to remain compliant with the Multi-Level Protection Scheme (MLPS 2.0).4 Utilising a Western-only platform secured by AES-256 is, from a legal standpoint in that jurisdiction, equivalent to submitting an unsigned document.47

Strategic Diversity in the Post-Quantum Era

The impulse toward digital sovereignty is often equated with control, but from a technical perspective, it is a project of “thick autonomy”.50 By diversifying the algorithmic landscape, the international community becomes more resilient to systemic risks.32 If a major breakthrough were to compromise lattice-based post-quantum schemes, the existence of alternative code-based or hash-based sovereign standards would provide a vital safety net.32

This drive for independence is not unique to China. Countries like Indonesia and various European states are increasingly exploring “indigenous algorithm design” and “sovereign cryptographic systems” to ensure long-term digital independence.48 The goal is not to isolate but to ensure that the “invisible backbone” of the digital economy, cryptography, is not entirely dependent on a single geopolitical actor.33

Implementation and TLS 1.3 Integration

The practical viability of the Guomi suite is demonstrated by its integration into standard internet protocols. RFC 8998 provides the specification for using SM2, SM3, and SM4 within the TLS 1.3 framework.4 This is critical for ensuring that high-security products can maintain interoperability while meeting national security requirements.3

TLS 1.3 Cipher Suites

RFC 8998 defines two primary cipher suites that utilize the Guomi algorithms to fulfill the confidentiality and authenticity requirements of TLS 1.3:

  1. TLS_SM4_GCM_SM3 (0x00, 0xC6)
  2. TLS_SM4_CCM_SM3 (0x00, 0xC7) 4

These suites use SM4 in either Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) or Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode to provide Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD).4

FeatureAEAD_SM4_GCMAEAD_SM4_CCM
Key Length16 octets (128 bits)16 octets (128 bits)
Nonce/IV Length12 octets12 octets
Authentication Tag16 octets16 octets
Max Plaintext octets octets

The choice between GCM and CCM often depends on the underlying hardware; GCM is widely preferred for its high-speed parallel processing capabilities, whereas CCM is often utilised in wireless standards like WAPI where resource constraints are more acute.2

Hardware and Software Ecosystem

A robust ecosystem has emerged to support the Guomi suite. The primary open-source implementation is GmSSL, a fork of OpenSSL specifically optimized for SM algorithms.2 In terms of hardware, support has expanded significantly:

  • Intel: Processors starting from Arrow Lake S, Lunar Lake, and Diamond Rapids include native SM4 support.2
  • ARM: The ARMv8.4-A expansion includes dedicated SM4 instructions.2
  • RISC-V: The Zksed extension for RISC-V, ratified in 2021, provides ratified support for SM4.2

This hardware integration is crucial for narrowing the performance gap between SM4 and AES-128. Specialised ISA extensions can reduce the instruction count for an SM4 step to just 6.5 arithmetic instructions, making it a highly efficient choice for high-speed TLS communication and secure storage in mobile devices.16

Hands-on Primer: Implementing Guomi Locally

To truly appreciate the technical nuances of the Guomi suite, it is essential to move beyond the theoretical and experiment with these algorithms in a controlled environment. Most modern systems can support Guomi implementation through two primary channels: the GmSSL command-line toolkit and high-level Python libraries.

Command-Line Walkthrough: GmSSL and OpenSSL

The standard tool for interacting with SM algorithms is GmSSL, an open-source project that implements SM2, SM3, and SM4. While standard OpenSSL has added support for these algorithms, GmSSL remains the reference implementation for developers seeking the full range of national standards.

  1. SM2 Key Generation:
    Generating an SM2 private key results in an ASN.1 structured file (often .sm2 or .pem).
    Bash
    # Generate a private key
    gmssl sm2 -genkey -out private_key.pem
    # Derive the public key (the (x, y) coordinates of point Q)
    gmssl sm2 -pubout -in private_key.pem -out public_key.pem
  2. SM3 Hashing:
    Hash a file to verify its integrity, equivalent to a 256-bit “digital fingerprint.”
    Bash
    gmssl sm3 <your_file.txt>

3. SM4 Symmetric Encryption:
Encrypt a file using SM4 in CBC mode, which requires a 128-bit key and an initialisation vector (IV).
Bash
gmssl sms4 -e -in message.txt -out message.enc

Python Code Walkthrough: pygmssl

For developers building applications, Python provides straightforward wrappers such as pygmssl that abstract the complexity of C-based implementations.

Step 1: Environment Setup

Install the library via pip:

Bash

pip install pygmssl

Step 2: Hashing with SM3

The library requires input data to be formatted as bytes. Strings must be encoded before processing.

Python

from pygmssl.sm3 import SM3

data = b"hello, world"
# Compute hash in a single call
print(f"SM3 Hash: {SM3(data).hexdigest()}")

# Or hash by part for streaming data
s3 = SM3()
s3.update(b"hello, ")
s3.update(b"world")
print(f"Streaming Hash: {s3.hexdigest()}")

Step 3: Symmetric Encryption with SM4

SM4 operates on 128-bit blocks, making it highly efficient for bulk data encryption when used in modes like CBC.

Python

from pygmssl.sm4 import SM4, MOD

# Key and IV must be 16 bytes (128 bits)
key = b'0123456789abcdef'
iv = b'fedcba9876543210'

cipher = SM4(key, mode=MOD.CBC, iv=iv)
plaintext = b"sensitive data"

# The library handles padding (typically PKCS7) automatically
ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(plaintext)
decrypted = cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)

assert plaintext == decrypted

Step 4: Asymmetric Identity with SM2

SM2 can be used to generate key pairs and sign messages, proving possession of a private key without disclosing it.

Python

from pygmssl.sm2 import SM2

# Generate a new pair: 32-byte private key, 64-byte public key (x,y)
s2 = SM2.generate_new_pair()
print(f"Private Key: {s2.pri_key.hex()}")
print(f"Public Key: {s2.pub_key.hex()}")

This hands-on accessibility ensures that organisations can test for “crypto-agility” and compatibility within their local development cycles before committing to regional deployments.

Strategic Option

The determination of whether an encryption standard is “better” is contextual. When evaluated against the requirements of the modern geopolitical and technical era, the Guomi suite offers several unique advantages over the exclusive use of Western standards.

Diversity as a Defense Strategy

Systemic risk reduction is perhaps the strongest technical argument for adopting SM3 and SM4 alongside traditional standards.32 A “monoculture” in cryptography—where everyone uses the same NIST curves and SHA-2 functions—is a security vulnerability.32 A breakthrough against one design would leave the global economy exposed.33 The Guomi suite provides a separate mathematical lineage, ensuring that the digital landscape remains resilient even if unforeseen vulnerabilities are found in SPN-based ciphers or specific ECC parameter sets.32

Computational and Algebraic Superiority

  • Hashing Efficiency: While SHA-256 remains the global baseline, SM3’s structural design is highly optimized for GPU parallelism, making it a “better” option for emerging high-throughput applications like distributed ledgers and real-time data integrity audits.7
  • Symmetric Robustness: SM4’s Feistel structure offers a more compact hardware profile than AES and exhibits greater resistance to algebraic attacks, which are a primary concern in the era of advanced analytical cryptanalysis.16
  • Asymmetric Versatility: SM2 offers a state-vetted alternative to NIST curves, avoiding the “black box” controversies that have plagued Western ECC while providing a significant performance leap over legacy RSA systems.21

Navigating the Geopolitical Reality

From a strategic standpoint, an independent encryption standard is a prerequisite for state autonomy.48 For organisations operating globally, “crypto-agility”, he ability to support both NIST and Guomi suites is no longer optional; it is a regulatory and commercial necessity.34 The transition to sovereign standards ensures that the “cover time” of sensitive data is protected not just by the length of a key, but by the independence of the verification process and the diversity of the underlying mathematics. 32 As we approach the quantum era and the potential of “Q-Day,” the maturity of the Guomi suite provides a vital fallback. Its international standardisation and robust hardware support signify that China’s recommended algorithms have transitioned from a regional requirement to a foundational element of the global secure communication framework. The case for SM3 and SM4 is not one of replacing existing standards, but of expanding the arsenal of cryptographic tools available to defend the integrity and confidentiality of the world’s digital infrastructure.32

References & Further Reading:

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  49. Cryptography Law: OSCCA Seeks Public Comments on the Cryptography Law | China Law Vision, accessed on April 7, 2026, https://www.chinalawvision.com/2017/05/intellectual-property/cryptography-law-oscca-seeks-public-comments-on-the-cryptography-law/
  50. Thin sovereignty, thick autonomy – Binding Hook, accessed on April 7, 2026, https://bindinghook.com/thin-sovereignty-thick-autonomy/
  51. RFC 8998 – ShangMi (SM) Cipher Suites for TLS 1.3 – IETF Datatracker, accessed on April 7, 2026, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8998
Trump’s Executive Order 14144 Overhaul, Part 2: Analysis of Post Quantum Cryptography Clauses

Trump’s Executive Order 14144 Overhaul, Part 2: Analysis of Post Quantum Cryptography Clauses

While Part 1 explored how the amendment reinforced a sanctions-led approach and repositioned AI policy within the broader cybersecurity doctrine, this second instalment shifts focus to its most understated move — the cryptographic recalibration. Executive Order 14144’s treatment of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) may appear procedural at first glance, but in its omissions and realignments lies a deeper signal about how the United States intends to balance resilience, readiness, and sovereignty in a quantum-threatened world.

Executive Summary

The June 2025 amendment to Executive Order 14144 quietly redefines the United States’ approach to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). While it retains the recognition of CRQC as a threat and maintains certain tactical mandates such as TLS 1.3, it rolls back critical enforcement mechanisms and abandons global coordination. This signals a strategic recalibration, shifting from enforced transition to selective readiness. For enterprise CISOs, vendors, and cybersecurity strategists, the message is clear: leadership on PQC will now emerge from the ground up.

What the Amendment Changed

The Trump administration’s June 2025 revision to EO 14144 leaves much of the cryptographic threat framing intact, but systematically reduces deployment timelines and global mandates. Notably:

  • CRQC remains listed as a critical national threat
  • TLS 1.3 mandate remains, now with clarified deadlines
  • SSDF and patching guidance are retained
  • The CISA product list deadline is upheld

However, three key changes undermine its enforceability:

  • The 90-day procurement trigger for PQC tools is removed
  • Agencies are no longer required to deploy PQC when available
  • The international coordination clause promoting NIST PQC globally is eliminated

Why the International Clause Matters

The removal of the global coordination clause is more than a bureaucratic adjustment; it represents a strategic shift.

Possible Reasons:

  • Geopolitical pragmatism: Aligning allies behind NIST PQC may be unrealistic with Europe pursuing crypto-sovereignty and China promoting SM2
  • Avoiding early lock-in: Promoting PQC globally before commercial maturity risks advocating immature technologies
  • Supply chain nationalism: This may be a move to protect the domestic PQC ecosystem from premature exposure or standards capture
  • Sanctions-first strategy: The EO prioritises the preservation of cyber sanctions infrastructure, signalling a move from soft power (standards promotion) to hard deterrence

This aligns with the broader tone of the EO amendment, consolidating national tools while reducing forward-facing mandates.

From Mandate to Optionality: PQC Enforcement Rolled Back

The deletion of the PQC procurement requirement and deployment enforcement transforms the United States’ posture from proactive to reactive. There is no longer a mandate that agencies or vendors use post-quantum encryption; instead, it encourages awareness.

This introduces several risks:

  • Agencies may delay PQC adoption while awaiting further guidance
  • Vendors face uncertainty, questioning whether to prepare for future mandates or focus on current market readiness
  • Federal supply chains may remain vulnerable well into the 2030s

Strategic Implications: A Doctrine of Selective Resilience

This amendment reflects a broader trend: preserving the appearance of resilience without committing to costly transitions. It signifies:

  • A shift towards agency-level discretion over central enforcement
  • A belief that commercial readiness should precede policy enforcement
  • A pivot from global cyber diplomacy to domestic cyber deterrence

This is not a retreat, it is a repositioning.

What Enterprises and Vendors Should Do Now

Despite the rollback, the urgency surrounding PQC remains. Forward-thinking organisations should:

  • Inventory vulnerable cryptographic systems such as RSA and ECC
  • Introduce crypto-agility frameworks to support seamless algorithm transitions
  • Explore hybrid encryption schemes that combine classical and quantum-safe algorithms
  • Monitor NIST, NSA (CNSA 2.0), and OMB guidance closely

For vendors, supporting PQC and crypto-agility will soon become a market differentiator rather than merely a compliance requirement.

Conclusion: Optionality is Not Immunity

The Trump EO amendment does not deny the quantum threat. It simply refrains from mandating early adoption. This increases the importance of voluntary leadership. Those who embed quantum-resilient architectures today will become the trust anchors of the future.

Optionality may offer policy flexibility, but it does not eliminate risk.

References and Further Reading

  1. Executive Order 14144 (January 2025)
  2. EO Amendment (June 2025)
  3. NIST PQC Project
  4. NSA CNSA 2.0 Requirements
  5. OMB M-23-02 Memo on Cryptographic Inventory
NIST selects HQC as the 5th Post-Quantum Algorithm: What you need to Know?

NIST selects HQC as the 5th Post-Quantum Algorithm: What you need to Know?

The Evolution of Post-Quantum Cryptography: NIST’s Fifth Algorithm Selection and Its Impact

Introduction

Quantum computing is no longer just a theoretical curiosity—it is advancing towards real-world applications. With these advances comes a major challenge: how do we keep our data secure when today’s encryption methods become obsolete?

Recognising this urgent need, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been working to standardise cryptographic algorithms that can withstand quantum threats. On March 11, 2025, NIST made a significant announcement: the selection of Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) as the fifth standardised post-quantum encryption algorithm. This code-based algorithm serves as a backup to ML-KEM (Module-Lattice Key Encapsulation Mechanism), ensuring that the cryptographic landscape remains diverse and resilient.

Business and Regulatory Implications

Why This Matters for Organisations

For businesses, governments, and security leaders, the post-quantum transition is not just an IT issue—it is a strategic necessity. The ability of quantum computers to break traditional encryption is not a question of if, but when. Organisations that fail to prepare may find themselves vulnerable to security breaches, regulatory non-compliance, and operational disruptions.

Key Deadlines & Compliance Risks

  • By 2030: NIST will deprecate all 112-bit security algorithms, requiring organisations to transition to quantum-resistant encryption.
  • By 2035: Quantum-vulnerable cryptography will be disallowed, meaning organisations must adopt new standards or risk compliance failures.
  • Government Mandates: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has already issued Binding Operational Directive 23-02, requiring federal vendors to begin their post-quantum transition.
  • EU Regulations: The European Union is advocating for algorithm agility, urging businesses to integrate multiple cryptographic methods to future-proof their security.

How Organisations Should Respond

To stay ahead of these changes, organisations should:

  • Implement Hybrid Cryptography: Combining classical and post-quantum encryption ensures a smooth transition without immediate overhauls.
  • Monitor Supply Chain Dependencies: Ensuring Software Bill-of-Materials (SBOM) compliance can help track cryptographic vulnerabilities.
  • Leverage Automated Tooling: NIST-recommended tools like Sigstore can assist in managing cryptographic transitions.
  • Pilot Test Quantum-Resistant Solutions: By 2026, organisations should begin hybrid ML-KEM/HQC deployments to assess performance and scalability.

Technical Breakdown: Understanding HQC and Its Role

Background: The NIST PQC Standardisation Initiative

Since 2016, NIST has been leading the effort to standardise post-quantum cryptography. The urgency stems from the fact that Shor’s algorithm, when executed on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer, can break RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman encryption—the very foundations of today’s secure communications.

How We Got Here: NIST’s Selection Process

  • August 2024: NIST finalised its first three PQC standards:
    • FIPS 203 – ML-KEM (for key exchange)
    • FIPS 204 – ML-DSA (for digital signatures)
    • FIPS 205 – SLH-DSA (for stateless hash-based signatures)
  • March 2025: NIST added HQC as a code-based backup to ML-KEM, ensuring an alternative in case lattice-based approaches face unforeseen vulnerabilities.

What Makes HQC Different?

HQC offers a code-based alternative to lattice cryptography, relying on quasi-cyclic codes and error-correction techniques.

  • Security Strength: HQC is based on the hardness of decoding random quasi-cyclic codes (QCSD problem). Its IND-CCA2 security is proven in the quantum random oracle model.
  • Efficient Performance:
    • HQC offers a key size of ~3,000 bits, significantly smaller than McEliece’s ~1MB keys.
    • It enables fast decryption while maintaining zero decryption failures in rank-metric implementations.
  • A Safety Net for Cryptographic Diversity: By introducing code-based cryptography, HQC provides a backup if lattice-based schemes, such as ML-KEM, prove weaker than expected.

Challenges & Implementation Considerations

Cryptographic Diversity & Risk Mitigation

  • Systemic Risk Reduction: A major breakthrough against lattice-based schemes would not compromise code-based HQC, ensuring resilience.
  • Regulatory Alignment: Many global cybersecurity frameworks now advocate for algorithmic agility, aligning with HQC’s role.

Trade-offs for Enterprises

  • Larger Key Sizes: HQC keys (~3KB) are larger than ML-KEM keys (~1.6KB), requiring more storage and processing power.
  • Legacy Systems: Organisations must modernise their infrastructure to support code-based cryptography.
  • Upskilling & Training: Engineers will need expertise in error-correcting codes, a different domain from lattice cryptography.

Looking Ahead: Preparing for the Post-Quantum Future

Practical Next Steps for Organisations

  • Conduct a Cryptographic Inventory: Use NIST’s PQC Transition Report to assess vulnerabilities in existing encryption methods.
  • Engage with Security Communities: Industry groups like the PKI Consortium and NIST Working Groups provide guidance on best practices.
  • Monitor Additional Algorithm Standardisation: Algorithms such as BIKE and Classic McEliece may be added in future updates.

Final Thoughts

NIST’s selection of HQC is more than just an academic decision—it is a reminder that cybersecurity is evolving, and businesses must evolve with it. The transition to post-quantum cryptography is not a last-minute compliance checkbox but a fundamental shift in how organisations secure their most sensitive data. Preparing now will not only ensure regulatory compliance but also protect against future cyber threats.

References & Further Reading

Why Do We Need Quantum-Resistant Security Standards?

Why Do We Need Quantum-Resistant Security Standards?

In October 2024, we discussed the profound implications of China’s quantum computing advancements and their potential to disrupt internet security. Quantum computers, with their unparalleled processing power, pose a direct threat to current encryption systems that secure global communications. Since then, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has made significant strides in shaping the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) landscape. This follow-up delves into NIST’s recent updates, including finalised standards, transition strategies, and their broader impact on global cybersecurity.


NIST’s Finalised Post-Quantum Encryption Standards

On August 13, 2024, NIST announced the release of its first three finalized post-quantum encryption standards. These standards are foundational for safeguarding electronic information in a quantum-enabled future, addressing key areas such as secure email communications, online transactions, and identity verification.

The standards selected are robust against both classical and quantum attacks, offering a proactive defence against the anticipated rise of quantum threats. While these are groundbreaking, NIST has emphasized the need for rapid adoption, encouraging enterprises and governments alike to begin transitioning their systems to quantum-resistant encryption.

Key highlights:

  • Algorithms: CRYSTALS-Kyber (public key encryption) and CRYSTALS-Dilithium (digital signatures) lead the finalized standards.
  • Applications: These standards are particularly suited for critical applications, such as financial systems, healthcare records, and government communications.

NIST’s Draft Transition Strategy and Timeline

In a draft report released on November 14, 2024, NIST outlined a detailed roadmap for migrating to PQC. This document provides clarity on the timeline and steps necessary to shift from current cryptographic protocols to quantum-resistant ones.

Key Aspects of the Draft:

  1. Transition Timeline:
    • Transition to begin immediately, with milestones for algorithm implementation by 2026.
    • Full adoption in federal systems is targeted by 2030, though enterprises are urged to act sooner.
  2. Evaluation and Risk Management:
    • A phased approach to identify and replace quantum-vulnerable systems.
    • Focus on testing and interoperability with existing infrastructure.
  3. Public Review Period:
    • The draft is open for comments until January 10, 2025, ensuring that the strategy incorporates diverse perspectives from industry leaders, academia, and government.

Guidance for Federal Agencies and Enterprises

To aid the transition, NIST has issued specific guidance tailored for federal agencies and private organizations:

  • Quantum Risk Assessments: Organizations must inventory their cryptographic systems and identify components vulnerable to quantum decryption.
  • Pilot Programs: Encouraged for testing quantum-resistant algorithms in controlled environments.
  • Training and Awareness: Enterprises need to upskill their workforce to understand and implement PQC effectively.

This proactive approach aligns with Executive Order 14028 on improving national cybersecurity, which mandates the adoption of innovative security measures across federal systems.


Enterprises Must Act Faster

While NIST has provided a structured timeline, cybersecurity experts warn that enterprises cannot afford to wait until the final deadlines. The development of practical quantum computers may outpace current expectations, leaving vulnerable systems exposed.

Recommendations for Enterprises:

  1. Prioritise Cryptographic Inventories: Develop a clear understanding of where cryptography is used and its quantum vulnerability.
  2. Develop a Migration Plan: Incorporate NIST’s guidance to create a tailored transition strategy.
  3. Collaborate with Vendors: Work with software and hardware providers to ensure seamless updates and integrations of PQC algorithms.

Global Implications and Call to Action

The transition to PQC is not just a technical challenge but a global imperative. With quantum computing breakthroughs occurring across nations, adopting quantum-resistant standards is essential for maintaining the integrity of digital systems. Organizations worldwide must:

  • Collaborate to ensure interoperability of PQC standards across borders.
  • Share best practices and innovations to accelerate the global transition.
  • Support research in next-generation cryptographic techniques to stay ahead of emerging threats.

Conclusion

NIST’s efforts in finalizing post-quantum encryption standards and drafting a comprehensive transition strategy mark a pivotal moment in cybersecurity. However, these initiatives are only as effective as their adoption. Governments, enterprises, and individuals must take urgent steps to align with these standards and safeguard their digital assets against the looming threat of quantum-powered attacks.

For further insights into how quantum computing advancements could reshape internet security, revisit our previous discussion: How Will China’s Quantum Advances Change Internet Security?.


References & Further Reading: 

  1. NIST IR 8547 – https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8547/ipd
  2. NIST IR 8413 – https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2022/NIST.IR.8413.pdf
  3. Dilithium – https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/
  4. Falcon – https://falcon-sign.info/
  5. PHINCS+ – https://sphincs.org/ 
  6. Trapdoor for hard Lattices in Cryptographic Constructs – https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/432 (Must read if you’re a programmer and interested in exploring Lattices) 
  7. Lattice-based cryptography – Chris Peikert, Georgia Institute of Tech – https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~cpeikert/pubs/slides-abit4.pdf
  8. Additional Source Codes to Explore – https://github.com/regras/labs  (This project is a Proof of Concept (PoC), about an Attribute-Based Signature scheme using lattices.)
How Will China’s Quantum Advances Change Internet Security?

How Will China’s Quantum Advances Change Internet Security?

Image Generated with Dalle 3

Introduction:

Chinese scientists have recently announced that they have successfully cracked military-grade encryption using a quantum computer with 372 qubits, a significant achievement that underscores the rapid evolution of quantum technology. This breakthrough has sparked concerns across global cybersecurity communities as RSA-2048 encryption—a widely regarded standard—was reportedly compromised. However, while this development signifies an important leap forward in quantum capabilities, its immediate implications are nuanced, particularly for everyday encryption protocols.

Drawing on technical insights from recent papers and analyses, this article delves deeper into the technological aspects of the breakthrough and explores why, despite this milestone, quantum computing still has limitations that prevent it from immediately threatening personal and business-level encryption.

The Quantum Breakthrough: Factoring RSA-2048

As reported by The Quantum Insider and South China Morning Post, the Chinese research team employed a 372-qubit quantum computer to crack RSA-2048 encryption, a cryptographic standard widely used to protect sensitive military information. RSA encryption relies on the difficulty of factoring large numbers, a task that classical computers would take thousands of years to solve. However, using quantum algorithms—specifically an enhanced version of Shor’s algorithm—the team demonstrated that quantum computers could break RSA-2048 in a much shorter time frame.

The breakthrough optimised Shor’s algorithm to function efficiently within the constraints of a 372-qubit machine. This marks a critical turning point in quantum computing, as it demonstrates the potential for quantum systems to tackle problems previously considered infeasible for classical systems. However, the paper from the Chinese Journal of Computers (2024) offers deeper insights into the quantum architecture and algorithmic refinements that made this breakthrough possible, highlighting both the computational power and limitations of the system.

Quantum Hardware and Algorithmic Optimisation

The technical aspects of the Chinese breakthrough, as detailed in the 2024 paper published in the Chinese Journal of Computers (CJC), emphasise the improvements in quantum hardware and algorithmic approaches that were key to this success. The paper outlines how the researchers enhanced Shor’s algorithm to mitigate the high error rates commonly associated with quantum computing, allowing for more stable computations over longer periods. This required optimising quantum gate operations, reducing quantum noise, and employing error-correction codes to preserve the integrity of qubit states.

Despite these improvements, the paper makes it clear that current quantum computers, including the 372-qubit machine used in this experiment, still suffer from several limitations. The system required an extremely controlled environment to maintain qubit coherence, and any deviation from ideal conditions would have introduced significant errors. Furthermore, the researchers faced challenges related to the scalability of the system, as error rates increase exponentially with the number of qubits involved. These limitations are consistent with the broader consensus in the field, as noted by Bill Buchanan and other experts, that practical quantum decryption on a global scale is not yet feasible.

The CJC paper also points out that while the breakthrough is impressive, it does not represent a complete realisation of quantum supremacy—the point at which quantum computers outperform classical computers across a wide range of tasks. The paper discusses the need for further advancements in quantum gate fidelity, qubit interconnectivity, and error correction to make quantum decryption scalable and applicable to broader, real-world encryption protocols.

Technical Analysis based on Li et al. (2024):

The paper explores two approaches for attacking RSA public key cryptography using quantum annealing:

1. Quantum Annealing for Combinatorial Optimization:

  • Method: This approach translates the mathematical attack method into a combinatorial optimization problem suited for the Ising model or QUBO model [1]. The Ising model represents a system of interacting spins, which can be mapped to the problem of factoring large integers used in RSA encryption.
  • Key Contribution: The paper proposes a high-level optimization model for multiplication tables and establishes a new dimensionality reduction formula. This formula reduces the number of qubits needed, thus saving resources and improving the stability of the Ising model [1]. The authors demonstrate this by successfully decomposing a two-million-level integer using a D-Wave Advantage system.
  • Comparison: This approach outperforms previous methods by universities and corporations like Purdue, Lockheed Martin, and Fujitsu [1]. This is achieved by significantly reducing the range of coefficients required in the Ising model, leading to a higher success rate in decomposition.
  • Focus: This technique represents a class of attack algorithms specifically designed for D-Wave quantum computers, known for their use of quantum annealing [1].

2. Quantum Annealing with Classical Methods:

  • Method: This approach combines the quantum annealing algorithm with established mathematical methods for cryptographic attacks, aiming to optimize attacks on specific cryptographic components [1]. It integrates the classical lattice reduction algorithm with the Schnorr algorithm.
  • Key Contribution: The authors leverage the quantum tunneling effect to adjust the rounding direction within the Babai algorithm, allowing for precise vector determination, a crucial step in the attack [1]. Quantum computing’s exponential acceleration capabilities address the challenge of calculating numerous rounded directions, essential for solving lattice problems [1]. Additionally, the paper proposes methods to improve search efficiency for close vectors, considering both qubit resources and time costs [1]. Notably, it demonstrates the first 50-bit integer decomposition on a D-Wave Advantage system, showcasing the algorithm’s versatility [1].
  • Comparison: The paper argues that D-Wave quantum annealing offers a more practical approach for smaller-scale attacks compared to Variational Quantum Algorithms (VQAs) on NISQ (Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum) computers. VQAs suffer from the “barren plateaus” problem, which can hinder algorithm convergence and limit effectiveness [1]. Quantum annealing is less susceptible to this limitation and offers an advantage when dealing with smaller-scale attacks.

Citations:

  1. Li, Gao, et al. “A Novel Quantum Annealing Attack on RSA Public Key Cryptosystems.” WC 2024 (2024).

Implications for Civilian Encryption: Limited Immediate Impact

While the Chinese breakthrough is undeniably significant, it is essential to recognise that the decryption of military-grade encryption does not immediately translate to vulnerabilities in civilian encryption protocols. Most personal and business communications rely on RSA-1024, elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC), or other lower-bit encryption systems. These systems remain secure against the capabilities of today’s quantum computers.

Moreover, as highlighted in the paper by Buchanan and echoed in the CJC analysis, many organisations are already transitioning towards post-quantum cryptography (PQC). PQC algorithms are specifically designed to withstand quantum attacks, ensuring that even as quantum computers advance, encryption systems will evolve to meet new threats.

Another key point raised by the CJC paper is that quantum decryption requires an immense amount of resources and computational power. The system used to break RSA-2048 involved highly specialised hardware and extensive computational time. Scaling such an operation to break everyday encryption protocols, such as those used in internet banking or personal communications, would require quantum computers with far more qubits and error-correction capabilities than are currently available.

Preparing for a Quantum Future: Post-Quantum Cryptography

As quantum computing technology evolves, it is imperative that governments, companies, and cybersecurity professionals continue preparing for the eventual reality of quantum decryption. This preparation includes developing and implementing post-quantum cryptographic solutions that are immune to quantum attacks. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has already initiated efforts to standardise post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, which are designed to be secure against both classical and quantum attacks. The CJC paper underlines the importance of this transition and suggests that PQC will likely become the new standard in encryption over the next decade.

In addition to PQC, the CJC paper highlights the need for ongoing research into hybrid encryption systems, which combine classical cryptographic techniques with quantum-resistant methods. These hybrid systems could provide a transitional solution, allowing existing infrastructure to remain secure while fully quantum-resistant algorithms are developed and implemented.

Conclusion: A Scientific Milestone with Limited Immediate Consequences

The Chinese research team’s quantum decryption of military-grade encryption is a groundbreaking scientific achievement, signalling that quantum computing is rapidly advancing towards practical applications. However, as emphasised in the technical analyses from the Chinese Journal of Computers and other sources, this breakthrough is not yet a direct threat to civilian encryption systems. Current quantum computers remain limited by their error rates, scalability challenges, and the need for controlled environments, preventing widespread decryption capabilities.

As organisations and governments prepare for a post-quantum future, the adoption of post-quantum cryptography and hybrid systems will be crucial in ensuring that encryption protocols remain robust against both classical and quantum threats. While the breakthrough highlights the potential power of quantum computing, its impact on everyday encryption is still years, if not decades, away.

References and Further Reading

  1. Bill Buchanan, “A Major Advancement on Quantum Cracking,” Medium, 2024.
  2. The Quantum Insider, “Chinese Scientists Report Using Quantum Computer to Hack Military-Grade Encryption,” October 11, 2024.
  3. South China Morning Post, “Chinese Scientists Hack Military-Grade Encryption Using Quantum Computer,” October 2024.
  4. Interesting Engineering, “China’s Scientists Successfully Hack Military-Grade Encryption with Quantum Computer,” October 2024.
  5. Shor, P.W., “Algorithms for Quantum Computation: Discrete Logarithms and Factoring,” Proceedings of the 35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 1994.
  6. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Post-Quantum Cryptography: Current Status,” 2024.
  7. Chinese Journal of Computers, “Quantum Algorithmic Enhancements in Breaking RSA-2048 Encryption,” 2024.
What Makes SM2 Encryption Special? China’s Recommended Algorithm

What Makes SM2 Encryption Special? China’s Recommended Algorithm

This article is intended for security enthusiasts or otherwise for people with an advanced understanding of Cryptography and some Programming. I have tried to give in some background theory a very basic implementation.

Are there backdoors in AES and what is China’s response to it?

The US NIST has been pushing AES as the standard for symmetric key encryption. However, many luminaries in cryptographic research and industry observers suspect that as possibly pushing a cipher with an NSA/ GCHQ backdoor. For Chinese entities (Government or commercial), the ShāngMì (SM) series of ciphers provide alternatives. The SM9 standards provide a family of algorithms which will perform the entire gamut of things that RSA or AES is expected to do. They include the following.

SM4 was developed by Lü Shuwang in 2007 and became a national standard (GB/T 32907–2016) in 2016 [RFC 8998].

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

ECC is one of the most prevalent approaches to public-key cryptography, along with Diffie–Hellman, RSA & YAK

Public-key Cryptography

Public-key cryptography relies on the generation of two keys:

  • one private key which must remain private
  • one public key which can be shared with the world

It is impossible to know a private key from a public key (it takes more than centuries to compute – assuming a workable quantum computer is infeasible using existing material science). It is possible to prove the possession of a private key without disclosing it. This proof can be verified by using its corresponding public key. This proof is called a digital signature.

High-level Functions

ECC can perform signature and verification of messages (authenticity). ECC can also perform encryption and decryption (confidentiality), however, not directly. For encryption/decryption, it needs the help of a shared secret aka Key.

It achieves the same level of security as RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman), the traditional public-key algorithm, using substantially shorter key sizes. This reduction translates into lower processing requirements and reduced storage demands. For instance, an ECC 256-bit key provides comparable security to an RSA 3072-bit key.

For brevity’s sake, I’d refer you to Hans Knutson’s very well-explained article on Hacker Noon

Theory Summary: A Look Inside SM2 Key Generation

This section aims to offer a simplified understanding of different parameters found in SM2 libraries and their corresponding meanings, drawing inspiration from the insightful guides by Hans Knutson on Hacker Noon and Svetlin Nakov’s CryptoBook. (links in the reference section)

Comparing RSA and ECC Key Generation:

  • RSA: Based on prime number factorization.
    • Private key: Composed of two large prime numbers (p and q).
    • Public key: Modulus (m) obtained by multiplying p and q (m = p * q).
    • Key size: Determined by the number of bits in modulus (m).
    • Difficulty: Decomposing m back into p and q is computationally intensive.
  • ECC: Leverages the discrete logarithm of elliptic curve elements.
    • Elliptic curve: Defined as the set of points (x, y) satisfying the equation y^2 = x^3 + ax + b.
    • Example: Bitcoin uses the curve secp256k1 with the equation y^2 = x^3 + 7.
    • Point addition: Defined operation on points of the curve.

Key Generation in SM2:

  1. Domain parameters:
    • A prime field p of 256 bits.
    • An elliptic curve E defined within the field p.
    • A base point G on the curve E.
    • Order n of G, representing the number of points in the subgroup generated by G.
  2. Private key:
    • Randomly chosen integer d (1 < d < n).
  3. Public key:
    • Point Q = d * G.

Understanding Parameters:

  • Prime field p: Defines the mathematical space where the curve operates.
  • Elliptic curve E: Provides a structure for performing cryptographic operations.
  • Base point G: Serves as a starting point for generating other points on the curve.
  • Order n: Represents the number of points in the subgroup generated by G, which dictates the security level of the scheme.
  • Private key d: Secret integer randomly chosen within a specific range.
  • Public key Q: Point obtained by multiplying the private key d with the base point G.

Visualization:

Imagine a garden with flowers planted on specific points (x, y) satisfying a unique equation. This garden represents the elliptic curve E. You have a special key (d) that allows you to move around the garden and reach a specific flower (Q) using a defined path. Each step on this path is determined by the base point G. While anyone can see the flower (Q), only you have the knowledge of the path (d) leading to it, thus maintaining confidentiality.

This analogy provides a simplified picture of key generation in SM2, illustrating the interplay between different parameters and their cryptographic significance.

Diving Deeper into SM2/SM3/SM4 Integration with Golang

This section focuses on the integration of the Chinese cryptographic standards SM2, SM3, and SM4 into Golang applications. It details the process of porting Java code to Golang and the specific challenges encountered.

Open-Source Implementations:

  • GmSSL: Main open-source implementation of SM2/SM3/SM4, stands for “Guomi.”
  • Other implementations: gmsm (Golang), gmssl (Python), CFCA SADK (Java).

Porting Java Code to Golang:

  • Goal: Reverse-engineer the usage of CFCA SADK in Java code and adapt the corresponding functionality in Golang using gmsm.
  • Approach:
    • Hashing (SM3) and encryption (SM4) algorithms were directly ported using equivalent functions across languages.
    • Security operations added to a classic REST API POST required specific attention.
    • Step 1:
      • Original parameters are concatenated in alphabetical order.
      • API key is appended.
      • The combined string is hashed using SM3.
      • The resulting hash is added as an additional POST parameter.
    • Step 2:
      • Original parameters are concatenated in alphabetical order.
      • The signature is generated using SM2.
      • Challenge: Golang library lacked PKCS7 formatting support for signatures, only supporting American standards.
      • Solution: Modification of the Golang library to support PKCS7 formatting for SM2 signatures.

Response Processing:

  • Response body is encrypted using SM4 with a key derived from the API key.
  • Response body includes both an SM3 hash and SM2 signature for verification.

Key Takeaways:

  • Porting cryptographic algorithms across languages requires careful consideration of specific functionalities.
  • Lack of standard support for specific formats (PKCS7 in this case) might necessitate library modification.
  • Integrating SM2/SM3/SM4 in Golang requires utilizing libraries like gmsm and potentially adapting them for specific needs.

Getting your Hands Dirty

Go to https://github.com/guanzhi/GmSSL/releases download the version for your OS and move to your working directory.

1 - $ unzip or tar -xvf GmSSL-master.zip/tar
2 - $ mkdir build
    $ cd build
    $ cmake ..
    $ make
    $ make test
    $ sudo make install
3 - $ gmssl version
    $ GmSSL 3.1.0 Dev
4 -
$ KEY=11223344556677881122334455667788
$ IV=11223344556677881122334455667788

$ echo hello | gmssl sm4 -cbc -encrypt -key $KEY -iv $IV -out sm4.cbc
$ gmssl sm4 -cbc -decrypt -key $KEY -iv $IV -in sm4.cbc

$ echo hello | gmssl sm4 -ctr -encrypt -key $KEY -iv $IV -out sm4.ctr
$ gmssl sm4 -ctr -decrypt -key $KEY -iv $IV -in sm4.ctr

$ echo -n abc | gmssl sm3
$ gmssl sm2keygen -pass 1234 -out sm2.pem -pubout sm2pub.pem
$ echo -n abc | gmssl sm3 -pubkey sm2pub.pem -id 1234567812345678
$ echo -n abc | gmssl sm3hmac -key 11223344556677881122334455667788

$ gmssl sm2keygen -pass 1234 -out sm2.pem -pubout sm2pub.pem

$ echo hello | gmssl sm2sign -key sm2.pem -pass 1234 -out sm2.sig #-id 1234567812345678
$ echo hello | gmssl sm2verify -pubkey sm2pub.pem -sig sm2.sig -id 1234567812345678

$ echo hello | gmssl sm2encrypt -pubkey sm2pub.pem -out sm2.der
$ gmssl sm2decrypt -key sm2.pem -pass 1234 -in sm2.der

$ gmssl sm2keygen -pass 1234 -out sm2.pem -pubout sm2pub.pem

$ echo hello | gmssl sm2encrypt -pubkey sm2pub.pem -out sm2.der
$ gmssl sm2decrypt -key sm2.pem -pass 1234 -in sm2.der

$ gmssl sm2keygen -pass 1234 -out rootcakey.pem
$ gmssl certgen -C CN -ST Beijing -L Haidian -O PKU -OU CS -CN ROOTCA -days 3650 -key rootcakey.pem -pass 1234 -out rootcacert.pem -key_usage keyCertSign -key_usage cRLSign
$ gmssl certparse -in rootcacert.pem

How to Get Keys

The private key used for SM2 signing was provided to us, along with a passphrase for testing purposes. Of course, in production systems, the private key is generated and kept private. The file extension is .sm2; the first step was to make use of it.

It can be parsed with:

$ openssl asn1parse -in file.sm2

    0:d=0  hl=4 l= 802 cons: SEQUENCE
    4:d=1  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :01
    7:d=1  hl=2 l=  71 cons: SEQUENCE
    9:d=2  hl=2 l=  10 prim: OBJECT            :1.2.156.10197.6.1.4.2.1
   21:d=2  hl=2 l=   7 prim: OBJECT            :1.2.156.10197.1.104
   30:d=2  hl=2 l=  48 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX DUMP]:8[redacted]7
   80:d=1  hl=4 l= 722 cons: SEQUENCE
   84:d=2  hl=2 l=  10 prim: OBJECT            :1.2.156.10197.6.1.4.2.1
   96:d=2  hl=4 l= 706 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX DUMP]:308[redacted]249

The OID 1.2.156.10197.1.104 means SM4 Block Cipher. The OID 1.2.156.10197.6.1.4.2.1 simply means data.

.sm2 files are an ASN.1 structure encoded in DER and base64-ed. The ASN.1 structure contains (int, seq1, seq2). Seq1 contains the SM4-encrypted SM2 private key x. Seq2 contains the x509 cert of the corresponding SM2 public key (ECC coordinates (x,y) of the point X). From the private key x, it is also possible to get X=x•P.

The x509 certificate is signed by CFCA, and the signature algorithm 1.2.156.10197.1.501 means SM2 Signing with SM3.

How to Sign with SM2

Now that the private key x is known, it is possible to use it to sign the concatenation of parameters and return the PKCS7 format expected.

As a reminder, ECC Digital Signature Algorithm takes a random number k. This is why it is important to add a random generator to the signing function. It is also difficult to troubleshoot: signing the same message twice will provide different outputs.

The signature will return two integers, r and s, as defined previously.

The format returned is PKCS7, which is structured with ASN.1. The asn1js tool is perfect for reading and comparing ASN.1 structures. For maximum privacy, it should be cloned and used locally.

The ASN.1 structure of the signature will follow:

  • The algorithm used as hash, namely 1.2.156.10197.1.401 (sm3Hash)
  • The data that is signed, with OID 1.2.156.10197.6.1.4.2.1 (data)
  • A sequence of the x509 certificates corresponding to the private keys used to sign (we can sign with multiple keys)
  • A set of the digital signatures for all the keys/certificates signing. Each signature is a sequence of the corresponding certificate information (countryName, organizationName, commonName) and finally the two integer r and s, in hexadecimal representation

To generate such signature, the Golang equivalent is:

import (
	"math/big"
	"encoding/hex"
	"encoding/base64"
	"crypto/rand"
	"github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2"
	"github.com/pgaulon/gmsm/x509" // modified PKCS7
)

[...]

	PRIVATE, _ := hex.DecodeString("somehexhere")
	PUBLICX, _ := hex.DecodeString("6de24a97f67c0c8424d993f42854f9003bde6997ed8726335f8d300c34be8321")
	PUBLICY, _ := hex.DecodeString("b177aeb12930141f02aed9f97b70b5a7c82a63d294787a15a6944b591ae74469")

	priv := new(sm2.PrivateKey)
	priv.D = new(big.Int).SetBytes(PRIVATE)
	priv.PublicKey.X = new(big.Int).SetBytes(PUBLICX)
	priv.PublicKey.Y = new(big.Int).SetBytes(PUBLICY)
	priv.PublicKey.Curve = sm2.P256Sm2()

	cert := getCertFromSM2(sm2CertPath) // utility to provision a x509 object from the .sm2 file data
	sign, _ := priv.Sign(rand.Reader, []byte(toSign), nil)
	signedData, _ := x509.NewSignedData([]byte(toSign))
	signerInfoConf := x509.SignerInfoConfig{}
	signedData.AddSigner(cert, priv, signerInfoConf, sign)
	pkcs7SignedBytes, _ := signedData.Finish()
	return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pkcs7SignedBytes)

Key Takeaways: Demystifying SM2 Cryptography

  1. SM2 relies on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC): This advanced mathematical method provides superior security compared to traditional RSA algorithms.
  2. ECC keys are unique: The public key is a point reached by repeatedly adding the base point to itself a specific number of times. This number acts as the private key and remains secret.
  3. ECC signatures are dynamic: Unlike static signatures, ECC signatures use a random element, ensuring they vary even for the same message. Each signature consists of two unique values (r and s).
  4. Troubleshooting tools: ASN.1 issues can be tackled with asn1js, while Java problems can be identified using jdb and jd-gui.
  5. Cryptography requires expertise: Understanding and implementing cryptographic algorithms like SM2 demands specialized knowledge and careful attention.

References & Further Reading:

  1. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
  2. What is the math behind elliptic curve cryptography? | HackerNoon 
  3. Releases · guanzhi/GmSSL
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