Category: Information Security

A Step-by-Step Guide to Implementing AttackGen for Improved Incident Response

A Step-by-Step Guide to Implementing AttackGen for Improved Incident Response

In the ever-evolving landscape of cybersecurity, preparing for potential incidents is crucial. One innovative tool making waves in this domain is AttackGen. Developed by Matthew Adams, who heads the Security for GenerativeAI at Citi, AttackGen is designed to generate tailored incident response scenarios. This cutting-edge tool leverages the power of large language models (LLMs) to generate customized incident response scenarios tailored to specific industries and company sizes. Whether you’re in Aerospace & Defense or FinTech or Healthcare, AttackGen offers invaluable training scenarios to enhance your cybersecurity incident response capabilities.

What is AttackGen?

AttackGen is a cybersecurity incident response testing tool designed to help organizations prepare for potential threats. By using LLMs, it creates realistic incident response scenarios based on the chosen industry and company size. For instance, it can generate scenarios for a “Large” company with 201-1,000 employees in the Aerospace & Defense sector. These tailored scenarios are essential for training cybersecurity incident responders, providing them with practical, industry-specific exercises.

How to Get Started with AttackGen

To start using AttackGen, follow these steps:

  1. Clone the Repository
    First, you’ll need to clone the AttackGen repository from GitHub. You can find it by searching for “AttackGen” or the profile of its creator, Matt Adams.
   git clone https://github.com/mrwadams/attackgen.git
  1. Navigate to the Directory
    Change into the newly created ‘attackgen’ directory.
    cd attackgen
  1. Install Requirements
    Install the necessary Python packages to run the tool.
   pip install -r requirements.txt
  1. Download MITRE ATT&CK Framework
    Download the latest version of the MITRE ATT&CK framework and place it in the “data” directory within the attackgen folder.
    Download MITRE ATT&CK Framework

5. Run the Application
Start the application using Streamlit.

   streamlit run 👋_Welcome.py

Using AttackGen

Once the application is up and running, open it in your preferred web browser. You’ll be greeted with the main page where you’ll need to enter your OpenAI API key. Also, for the record, AttackGen supports multiple LLMs, including the vaunted Mistral, Google AI, ollama and Azure OpenAI. After selecting your preferred models and entering your API key, follow these steps:

  1. Select Industry and Company Size
    Choose your company’s industry and size to tailor the incident response scenarios.
  2. Generate Scenario
    Click on “✨ Generate Scenario” to proceed.
  3. Choose Threat Actor Group
    On the next page, select a threat actor group and associated ATT&CK techniques.
  4. Download Scenario
    After generating the scenario, you can download it in Markdown format for use in your incident response training. It’s advisable to upload this scenario to your version control system promptly.

Visualizing Your Scenarios

For those interested in visualizing the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) included in your scenarios, consider using the ATT&CK Navigator. This tool helps identify, highlight, and prioritize TTPs effectively. You can learn more about this in one of my previous posts on Analyzing and Visualizing Cyberattacks using Attack Flow.

Conclusion

AttackGen is a powerful tool for enhancing your incident response training by providing realistic, industry-specific scenarios. Kudos to Matt Adams for developing this innovative tool. For more insights and guides on cybersecurity, follow me as I continue to explore and share new tools and techniques every week. Your feedback is always welcome!


References and Further Reading:

Feel free to reach out with any questions or suggestions. Happy hunting! 🚀

Mastering Cyber Defense: The Impact Of AI & ML On Security Strategies

Mastering Cyber Defense: The Impact Of AI & ML On Security Strategies

The cybersecurity landscape is a relentless battlefield. Attackers are constantly innovating, churning out new threats at an alarming rate. Traditional security solutions are struggling to keep pace. But fear not, weary defenders! Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) are emerging as powerful weapons in our arsenal, offering the potential to revolutionize cybersecurity.

The Numbers Don’t Lie: Why AI/ML Matters

  • Security Incidents on the Rise: According to the IBM Security X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2023 https://www.ibm.com/reports/threat-intelligence, the average organization experienced 270 data breaches in 2022, a staggering 13% increase from the previous year.
  • Alert Fatigue is Real: Security analysts are bombarded with a constant stream of alerts, often leading to “alert fatigue” and missed critical threats. A study by the Ponemon Institute found that it takes an average of 280 days to identify and contain a security breach https://www.ponemon.org/.

AI/ML to the Rescue: Current Applications

AI and ML are already making a significant impact on cybersecurity:

  • Reverse Engineering Malware with Speed: AI can disassemble and analyze malicious code at lightning speed, uncovering its functionalities and vulnerabilities much faster than traditional methods. This allows defenders to understand attacker tactics and develop effective countermeasures before widespread damage occurs.
  • Prioritizing the Vulnerability Avalanche: Legacy vulnerability scanners often generate overwhelming lists of potential weaknesses. AI can prioritize these vulnerabilities based on exploitability and potential impact, allowing security teams to focus their efforts on the most critical issues first. A study by McAfee found that organizations can reduce the time to patch critical vulnerabilities by up to 70% using AI https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/internet-security/the-what-why-and-how-of-ai-and-threat-detection/.
  • Security SIEMs Get Smarter: Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems ingest vast amounts of security data. AI can analyze this data in real-time, correlating events and identifying potential threats with an accuracy far exceeding human capabilities. This significantly improves threat detection accuracy and reduces the time attackers have to operate undetected within a network.

The Future of AI/ML in Cybersecurity: A Glimpse Beyond

As AI and ML technologies mature, we can expect even more transformative applications:

  • Context is King: AI can be trained to understand the context of security events, considering user behaviour, network activity, and system configurations. This will enable highly sophisticated threat detection and prevention capabilities, automatically adapting to new situations and attacker tactics.
  • Automating Security Tasks: Imagine a future where AI automates not just vulnerability scanning, but also incident response, patch management, and even threat hunting. This would free up security teams to focus on more strategic initiatives and significantly improve overall security posture.

Challenges and Considerations: No Silver Bullet

While AI/ML offers immense potential, it’s important to acknowledge the challenges:

  • Explainability and Transparency: AI models can sometimes make decisions that are difficult for humans to understand. This lack of explainability can make it challenging to trust and audit AI-powered security systems. Security teams need to ensure they understand how AI systems reach conclusions and that these conclusions are aligned with overall security goals.
  • Data Quality and Bias: The effectiveness of AI/ML models heavily relies on the quality of the data they are trained on. Biased data can lead to biased models that might miss certain threats or flag legitimate activity as malicious. Security teams need to ensure their training data is diverse and unbiased to avoid perpetuating security blind spots.

The Takeaway: Embrace the Future

Security practitioners and engineers are at the forefront of adopting and shaping AI/ML solutions. By understanding the current applications, future potential, and the associated challenges, you can ensure that AI becomes a powerful ally in your cybersecurity arsenal. Embrace AI/ML, and together we can build a more secure future!

#AI #MachineLearning #Cybersecurity #ThreatDetection #SecurityAutomation

P.S. Check out these resources to learn more:

NIST Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0): https://www.nist.gov/itl/ai-risk-management-framework) by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

Understanding The Implications Of The Data Breaches At Microsoft.

Understanding The Implications Of The Data Breaches At Microsoft.

Note: I started this article last weekend to try and explain the attack path  “Midnight Blizzard” used and what Azure admins should do to protect themselves from a similar attack. Unfortunately, I couldn't complete/publish it in time and now there is another breach at Microsoft. (🤦🏿) Now, I had to completely redraft it and change the focus to a summary of data breaches at Microsoft and a walkthrough on the current breach. I will publish the Midnight Blizzard defence later this week.
Microsoft Data Breach

The Timeline of the Breaches

  • 20th-25th September 2023: 60k State Department Emails Stolen in Microsoft Breach
  • 12th-25th January 2024: Microsoft breached by “Nation-State Actors”
  • 11th-14th February 2024: State-backed APTs are weaponising OpenAI models 
  • 16th-19th February 2024: Microsoft admits to security issues with Azure and Exchange servers.
Date/MonthBreach TypeAffected Service/AreaSource
February 2024Zero-day vulnerabilities in Exchange serversExchange serversMicrosoft Security Response Center blog
January 2024Nation State-sponsored attack (Russia)Email accountsMicrosoft Security Response Center blog
February 2024State-backed APTs are weaponising OpenAI modelsNot directly impacting MS services
July 2023Chinese Hackers Breach U.S. Agencies Via Microsoft CloudAzureThe New York Times, Microsoft Security Response Center blog
October 2022BlueBleed Data Leak, 0.5 Million user data leakedUser Data
December 2021Lapsus$ intrusionSource code (Bing, Cortana)The Guardian, Reuters
August 2021Hafnium attacks Exchange serversExchange serversMicrosoft Security Response Center blog
March 2021SolarWinds supply chain attackVarious Microsoft products (indirectly affected)The New York Times, Reuters
January 2020Misconfigured customer support databaseCustomer data (names, email addresses)ZDNet
This is a high-level summary of breaches and successful hacks that got reported in the public domain and picked up by tier 1 publications. There are at least a dozen more in the period, some are of negligible impact, and others are less probable

Introduction:

Today, The digital landscape is a battlefield, and even tech giants like Microsoft aren’t immune to cyberattacks. Understanding recent breaches/incidents and their root causes, and effective defence strategies is crucial for Infosec/IT and DevSecOp teams navigating this ever-evolving threat landscape. This blog post dives into the security incidents affecting Microsoft, analyzes potential attack paths, and equips you with actionable defence plans to fortify your infrastructure/network.

Selected Breaches:

  • January 2024: State actors, purported to be affiliated with Russia leveraged password spraying and compromised email accounts, including those of senior leadership. This highlights the vulnerability of weak passwords and the critical need for multi-factor authentication (MFA).
  • January 2024: Zero-day vulnerabilities in Exchange servers allowed attackers to escalate privileges. This emphasizes the importance of regular patching and prompt updates to address vulnerabilities before they’re exploited.
  • December 2021: Lapsus$ group gained access to source code due to misconfigured access controls. This underscores the importance of least-privilege access and regularly reviewed security configurations.
  • Other incidents: Supply chain attacks (SolarWinds, March 2021) and data leaks (customer database, January 2020) demonstrate the diverse threats organizations face.

Attack Paths:

Understanding attacker motivations and methods is key to building effective defences. Here are common attack paths:

  • Social Engineering: Phishing emails and deceptive tactics trick users into revealing sensitive information or clicking malicious links.
  • Software Vulnerabilities: Unpatched software with known vulnerabilities offers attackers an easy entry point.
  • Weak Passwords: Simple passwords are easily cracked, granting access to accounts and systems.
  • Misconfigured Access Controls: Overly permissive access rules give attackers more power than necessary to escalate privileges and cause damage.
  • Supply Chain Attacks: Compromising a vendor or partner can grant attackers access to multiple organizations within the supply chain.

Defence Plans:

Building a robust defense requires a multi-layered approach:

  • Patch Management: Prioritize timely patching of vulnerabilities across all systems and software.
  • Strong Passwords & MFA: Implement strong password policies and enforce MFA for all accounts.
  • Access Control Management: Implement least privilege access and regularly review configurations.
  • Security Awareness Training: Educate employees on phishing, social engineering, and secure password practices.
  • Threat Detection & Response: Deploy security tools to monitor systems for suspicious activity and respond promptly to incidents.
  • Incident Response Planning: Develop and test a plan to mitigate damage, contain breaches, and recover quickly.
  • Penetration Testing: Regularly test your defenses by simulating real-world attacks to identify and fix vulnerabilities before attackers do.
  • Network Segmentation: Segment your network to limit the potential impact of a breach by restricting access to critical systems.
  • Data Backups & Disaster Recovery: Regularly back up data and have a plan to restore it in case of an attack or outage.
  • Stay Informed: Keep up-to-date on the latest security threats and vulnerabilities by subscribing to security advisories and attending industry conferences.

Conclusion:

Cybersecurity is an ongoing battle, but by understanding the tactics employed by attackers and implementing these defence strategies, IT/DevOps admins can significantly reduce the risk of breaches and protect their networks and data. Remember, vigilance and continuous improvement are key to staying ahead of the curve in the ever-evolving cybersecurity landscape.

Disclaimer: This blog post is for informational purposes only and should not be considered professional security advice. Please consult with a qualified security professional for guidance specific to your organization or mail me for an obligation free consultation call.

References and Further Reading:

What Makes SM2 Encryption Special? China’s Recommended Algorithm

What Makes SM2 Encryption Special? China’s Recommended Algorithm

This article is intended for security enthusiasts or otherwise for people with an advanced understanding of Cryptography and some Programming. I have tried to give in some background theory a very basic implementation.

Are there backdoors in AES and what is China’s response to it?

The US NIST has been pushing AES as the standard for symmetric key encryption. However, many luminaries in cryptographic research and industry observers suspect that as possibly pushing a cipher with an NSA/ GCHQ backdoor. For Chinese entities (Government or commercial), the ShāngMì (SM) series of ciphers provide alternatives. The SM9 standards provide a family of algorithms which will perform the entire gamut of things that RSA or AES is expected to do. They include the following.

SM4 was developed by Lü Shuwang in 2007 and became a national standard (GB/T 32907–2016) in 2016 [RFC 8998].

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

ECC is one of the most prevalent approaches to public-key cryptography, along with Diffie–Hellman, RSA & YAK

Public-key Cryptography

Public-key cryptography relies on the generation of two keys:

  • one private key which must remain private
  • one public key which can be shared with the world

It is impossible to know a private key from a public key (it takes more than centuries to compute – assuming a workable quantum computer is infeasible using existing material science). It is possible to prove the possession of a private key without disclosing it. This proof can be verified by using its corresponding public key. This proof is called a digital signature.

High-level Functions

ECC can perform signature and verification of messages (authenticity). ECC can also perform encryption and decryption (confidentiality), however, not directly. For encryption/decryption, it needs the help of a shared secret aka Key.

It achieves the same level of security as RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman), the traditional public-key algorithm, using substantially shorter key sizes. This reduction translates into lower processing requirements and reduced storage demands. For instance, an ECC 256-bit key provides comparable security to an RSA 3072-bit key.

For brevity’s sake, I’d refer you to Hans Knutson’s very well-explained article on Hacker Noon

Theory Summary: A Look Inside SM2 Key Generation

This section aims to offer a simplified understanding of different parameters found in SM2 libraries and their corresponding meanings, drawing inspiration from the insightful guides by Hans Knutson on Hacker Noon and Svetlin Nakov’s CryptoBook. (links in the reference section)

Comparing RSA and ECC Key Generation:

  • RSA: Based on prime number factorization.
    • Private key: Composed of two large prime numbers (p and q).
    • Public key: Modulus (m) obtained by multiplying p and q (m = p * q).
    • Key size: Determined by the number of bits in modulus (m).
    • Difficulty: Decomposing m back into p and q is computationally intensive.
  • ECC: Leverages the discrete logarithm of elliptic curve elements.
    • Elliptic curve: Defined as the set of points (x, y) satisfying the equation y^2 = x^3 + ax + b.
    • Example: Bitcoin uses the curve secp256k1 with the equation y^2 = x^3 + 7.
    • Point addition: Defined operation on points of the curve.

Key Generation in SM2:

  1. Domain parameters:
    • A prime field p of 256 bits.
    • An elliptic curve E defined within the field p.
    • A base point G on the curve E.
    • Order n of G, representing the number of points in the subgroup generated by G.
  2. Private key:
    • Randomly chosen integer d (1 < d < n).
  3. Public key:
    • Point Q = d * G.

Understanding Parameters:

  • Prime field p: Defines the mathematical space where the curve operates.
  • Elliptic curve E: Provides a structure for performing cryptographic operations.
  • Base point G: Serves as a starting point for generating other points on the curve.
  • Order n: Represents the number of points in the subgroup generated by G, which dictates the security level of the scheme.
  • Private key d: Secret integer randomly chosen within a specific range.
  • Public key Q: Point obtained by multiplying the private key d with the base point G.

Visualization:

Imagine a garden with flowers planted on specific points (x, y) satisfying a unique equation. This garden represents the elliptic curve E. You have a special key (d) that allows you to move around the garden and reach a specific flower (Q) using a defined path. Each step on this path is determined by the base point G. While anyone can see the flower (Q), only you have the knowledge of the path (d) leading to it, thus maintaining confidentiality.

This analogy provides a simplified picture of key generation in SM2, illustrating the interplay between different parameters and their cryptographic significance.

Diving Deeper into SM2/SM3/SM4 Integration with Golang

This section focuses on the integration of the Chinese cryptographic standards SM2, SM3, and SM4 into Golang applications. It details the process of porting Java code to Golang and the specific challenges encountered.

Open-Source Implementations:

  • GmSSL: Main open-source implementation of SM2/SM3/SM4, stands for “Guomi.”
  • Other implementations: gmsm (Golang), gmssl (Python), CFCA SADK (Java).

Porting Java Code to Golang:

  • Goal: Reverse-engineer the usage of CFCA SADK in Java code and adapt the corresponding functionality in Golang using gmsm.
  • Approach:
    • Hashing (SM3) and encryption (SM4) algorithms were directly ported using equivalent functions across languages.
    • Security operations added to a classic REST API POST required specific attention.
    • Step 1:
      • Original parameters are concatenated in alphabetical order.
      • API key is appended.
      • The combined string is hashed using SM3.
      • The resulting hash is added as an additional POST parameter.
    • Step 2:
      • Original parameters are concatenated in alphabetical order.
      • The signature is generated using SM2.
      • Challenge: Golang library lacked PKCS7 formatting support for signatures, only supporting American standards.
      • Solution: Modification of the Golang library to support PKCS7 formatting for SM2 signatures.

Response Processing:

  • Response body is encrypted using SM4 with a key derived from the API key.
  • Response body includes both an SM3 hash and SM2 signature for verification.

Key Takeaways:

  • Porting cryptographic algorithms across languages requires careful consideration of specific functionalities.
  • Lack of standard support for specific formats (PKCS7 in this case) might necessitate library modification.
  • Integrating SM2/SM3/SM4 in Golang requires utilizing libraries like gmsm and potentially adapting them for specific needs.

Getting your Hands Dirty

Go to https://github.com/guanzhi/GmSSL/releases download the version for your OS and move to your working directory.

1 - $ unzip or tar -xvf GmSSL-master.zip/tar
2 - $ mkdir build
    $ cd build
    $ cmake ..
    $ make
    $ make test
    $ sudo make install
3 - $ gmssl version
    $ GmSSL 3.1.0 Dev
4 -
$ KEY=11223344556677881122334455667788
$ IV=11223344556677881122334455667788

$ echo hello | gmssl sm4 -cbc -encrypt -key $KEY -iv $IV -out sm4.cbc
$ gmssl sm4 -cbc -decrypt -key $KEY -iv $IV -in sm4.cbc

$ echo hello | gmssl sm4 -ctr -encrypt -key $KEY -iv $IV -out sm4.ctr
$ gmssl sm4 -ctr -decrypt -key $KEY -iv $IV -in sm4.ctr

$ echo -n abc | gmssl sm3
$ gmssl sm2keygen -pass 1234 -out sm2.pem -pubout sm2pub.pem
$ echo -n abc | gmssl sm3 -pubkey sm2pub.pem -id 1234567812345678
$ echo -n abc | gmssl sm3hmac -key 11223344556677881122334455667788

$ gmssl sm2keygen -pass 1234 -out sm2.pem -pubout sm2pub.pem

$ echo hello | gmssl sm2sign -key sm2.pem -pass 1234 -out sm2.sig #-id 1234567812345678
$ echo hello | gmssl sm2verify -pubkey sm2pub.pem -sig sm2.sig -id 1234567812345678

$ echo hello | gmssl sm2encrypt -pubkey sm2pub.pem -out sm2.der
$ gmssl sm2decrypt -key sm2.pem -pass 1234 -in sm2.der

$ gmssl sm2keygen -pass 1234 -out sm2.pem -pubout sm2pub.pem

$ echo hello | gmssl sm2encrypt -pubkey sm2pub.pem -out sm2.der
$ gmssl sm2decrypt -key sm2.pem -pass 1234 -in sm2.der

$ gmssl sm2keygen -pass 1234 -out rootcakey.pem
$ gmssl certgen -C CN -ST Beijing -L Haidian -O PKU -OU CS -CN ROOTCA -days 3650 -key rootcakey.pem -pass 1234 -out rootcacert.pem -key_usage keyCertSign -key_usage cRLSign
$ gmssl certparse -in rootcacert.pem

How to Get Keys

The private key used for SM2 signing was provided to us, along with a passphrase for testing purposes. Of course, in production systems, the private key is generated and kept private. The file extension is .sm2; the first step was to make use of it.

It can be parsed with:

$ openssl asn1parse -in file.sm2

    0:d=0  hl=4 l= 802 cons: SEQUENCE
    4:d=1  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :01
    7:d=1  hl=2 l=  71 cons: SEQUENCE
    9:d=2  hl=2 l=  10 prim: OBJECT            :1.2.156.10197.6.1.4.2.1
   21:d=2  hl=2 l=   7 prim: OBJECT            :1.2.156.10197.1.104
   30:d=2  hl=2 l=  48 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX DUMP]:8[redacted]7
   80:d=1  hl=4 l= 722 cons: SEQUENCE
   84:d=2  hl=2 l=  10 prim: OBJECT            :1.2.156.10197.6.1.4.2.1
   96:d=2  hl=4 l= 706 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX DUMP]:308[redacted]249

The OID 1.2.156.10197.1.104 means SM4 Block Cipher. The OID 1.2.156.10197.6.1.4.2.1 simply means data.

.sm2 files are an ASN.1 structure encoded in DER and base64-ed. The ASN.1 structure contains (int, seq1, seq2). Seq1 contains the SM4-encrypted SM2 private key x. Seq2 contains the x509 cert of the corresponding SM2 public key (ECC coordinates (x,y) of the point X). From the private key x, it is also possible to get X=x•P.

The x509 certificate is signed by CFCA, and the signature algorithm 1.2.156.10197.1.501 means SM2 Signing with SM3.

How to Sign with SM2

Now that the private key x is known, it is possible to use it to sign the concatenation of parameters and return the PKCS7 format expected.

As a reminder, ECC Digital Signature Algorithm takes a random number k. This is why it is important to add a random generator to the signing function. It is also difficult to troubleshoot: signing the same message twice will provide different outputs.

The signature will return two integers, r and s, as defined previously.

The format returned is PKCS7, which is structured with ASN.1. The asn1js tool is perfect for reading and comparing ASN.1 structures. For maximum privacy, it should be cloned and used locally.

The ASN.1 structure of the signature will follow:

  • The algorithm used as hash, namely 1.2.156.10197.1.401 (sm3Hash)
  • The data that is signed, with OID 1.2.156.10197.6.1.4.2.1 (data)
  • A sequence of the x509 certificates corresponding to the private keys used to sign (we can sign with multiple keys)
  • A set of the digital signatures for all the keys/certificates signing. Each signature is a sequence of the corresponding certificate information (countryName, organizationName, commonName) and finally the two integer r and s, in hexadecimal representation

To generate such signature, the Golang equivalent is:

import (
	"math/big"
	"encoding/hex"
	"encoding/base64"
	"crypto/rand"
	"github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/sm2"
	"github.com/pgaulon/gmsm/x509" // modified PKCS7
)

[...]

	PRIVATE, _ := hex.DecodeString("somehexhere")
	PUBLICX, _ := hex.DecodeString("6de24a97f67c0c8424d993f42854f9003bde6997ed8726335f8d300c34be8321")
	PUBLICY, _ := hex.DecodeString("b177aeb12930141f02aed9f97b70b5a7c82a63d294787a15a6944b591ae74469")

	priv := new(sm2.PrivateKey)
	priv.D = new(big.Int).SetBytes(PRIVATE)
	priv.PublicKey.X = new(big.Int).SetBytes(PUBLICX)
	priv.PublicKey.Y = new(big.Int).SetBytes(PUBLICY)
	priv.PublicKey.Curve = sm2.P256Sm2()

	cert := getCertFromSM2(sm2CertPath) // utility to provision a x509 object from the .sm2 file data
	sign, _ := priv.Sign(rand.Reader, []byte(toSign), nil)
	signedData, _ := x509.NewSignedData([]byte(toSign))
	signerInfoConf := x509.SignerInfoConfig{}
	signedData.AddSigner(cert, priv, signerInfoConf, sign)
	pkcs7SignedBytes, _ := signedData.Finish()
	return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pkcs7SignedBytes)

Key Takeaways: Demystifying SM2 Cryptography

  1. SM2 relies on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC): This advanced mathematical method provides superior security compared to traditional RSA algorithms.
  2. ECC keys are unique: The public key is a point reached by repeatedly adding the base point to itself a specific number of times. This number acts as the private key and remains secret.
  3. ECC signatures are dynamic: Unlike static signatures, ECC signatures use a random element, ensuring they vary even for the same message. Each signature consists of two unique values (r and s).
  4. Troubleshooting tools: ASN.1 issues can be tackled with asn1js, while Java problems can be identified using jdb and jd-gui.
  5. Cryptography requires expertise: Understanding and implementing cryptographic algorithms like SM2 demands specialized knowledge and careful attention.

References & Further Reading:

  1. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
  2. What is the math behind elliptic curve cryptography? | HackerNoon 
  3. Releases · guanzhi/GmSSL
How to select SSO Standard for your SaaS Application.

How to select SSO Standard for your SaaS Application.

For anyone developing any application on the cloud, the major concern is always how is security implemented. Typically, you start with an authentication system viz. Usernames & Passwords. As your application grows in size of use cases and adoption, you’ll soon find a necessity to improve your security posture, these could range from MFA, Federated Identity management and finally authorisation. You now have customers who ask if you can support their AD authorisation or OneLogin or Okta etc. 

This is when you’ll think about implementing a Single-Sign-On. But, the choice of how to keep data and identities secure begins much earlier for software architects and developers: selecting the standard that should be used to keep federated identities safe. This will involve two things, architecting an authorisation system – could be a separate service or bound with your application – this choice is critical to how you can grow as an organisation. 

Architecture Choice:

If you choose to integrate it with your main product and 2 months later your board directs you to develop a new offering, you’ll end up doing it all over again. On the contrary, if you’re not going to pivot to any new business line, the additional time you will incur in building an external “Accounts service” will be a tax on the GTM. 

Standards Choice:

IT Administrators and Security Architects must first choose the protocol or framework to use to maintain federated identity, or the mechanism of connecting a person’s electronic identity and attributes, safe while designing a plan to keep data and identities secure.

A Single Sign-On (SSO) account has the advantage of allowing employees to log in once to an application or network and not have to log in to several apps or networks during the workday. While this is beneficial to employees in terms of increasing productivity by eliminating the need to remember several passwords, it is also beneficial to IT and Security functions. The Identity and Access Management (IAM) platform responsible for maintaining employees’ credentials can assist make it more manageable by registering fewer passwords in the system.

It is, however, not an easy choice. Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), OpenID, and open authorization are the leading candidates in the federation process (OAuth). Let’s take a closer look at these technologies and determine when SAML, OAuth, and OpenID should be used.

What is Single Sign-On (SSO)?

SSO (Single Sign-On) is an authentication method that allows apps to validate users by using other trustworthy apps. Single sign-on allows a user to use a single ID and password to log into several applications.

SSO is an important part of an Identity and Access Management (IAM) platform for managing access. User identity verification is crucial for establishing what permissions a user will have.

SSO Standards

  • SAML

SAML is a protocol that allows an Identity Provider (IdP) to send a user’s credentials to a service provider for authentication and authorization. SAML allows for Single Sign-On (SSO) and streamlines password management. It is beneficial to businesses because employees are using an increasing number of applications to complete their tasks.

Keeping track of passwords for hundreds of programs used by hundreds, if not thousands, of employees can be difficult. SAML comes to the rescue by providing a single sign-on standard for businesses.

  • OAuth 

OAuth 2.0 is a secure authorization standard. It allows secure delegated access by providing third-party services with access tokens rather than exposing user credentials. It does not, however, authenticate; it just authorizes.

You’ve probably used OAuth 2.0 if you’ve ever signed up for a new app and consented to allow it automatically source fresh contacts from Facebook or your phone contacts. This standard ensures that delegated access is secure. This means that a program can operate on behalf of a user and access resources from a server without the user needing to provide their credentials. This is accomplished by allowing the Identity Provider (IdP) to issue tokens to third-party apps with the user’s permission.

  • OpenID

The OpenID Connect (OIDC) standard is used for authentication. OIDC is used by identity providers (those who generate and administer identities) so that users can log in with their IdP first and then access applications without having to re-enter their credentials.

This authentication option is recognizable if you’ve used your Google account to sign in to apps like YouTube or Facebook to log into an online shopping cart. Organizations use OpenID Connect to authenticate users, and it is an open standard. This is used by IdPs so that users can sign in to the IdP and then use their sign-in information to access other websites and apps without having to log in or disclose their sign-in information.

SAML VS OAuth VS OpenID

OAuth 2.0 is a framework for regulating authorization to a protected resource, such as a program or a set of files, whereas OpenID Connect and SAML are both federated authentication industry standards. As a result, OAuth 2.0 is used in quite different situations than the other two protocols, and it can be used in conjunction with either OpenID Connect or SAML.

OpenID Connect is based on the OAuth 2.0 protocol and uses an ID token, which is a JSON Web Token (JWT) that standardizes areas where OAuth 2.0 provides for flexibility, such as scopes and endpoint discovery. It depends on user authentication and is often used to make user logins easier on consumer websites and mobile apps.

Unlike JWT, SAML does not rely on OAuth and instead relies on a message exchange to authenticate in the XML SAML format. It’s more commonly used in enterprise settings to allow users to log in to several applications with a single password.

Final Thoughts

As technology advances and systems become more interconnected, federated identification becomes increasingly useful since it is more convenient for users. It saves them time by reducing the number of accounts and passwords they have to remember, but it raises some security concerns.

SAML has one feature that OAuth2 lacks: the SAML token contains the user identity information (because of signing). With OAuth2, you don’t get that out of the box, and instead, the Resource Server needs to make an additional round trip to validate the token with the Authorization Server.

On the other hand, with OAuth2 you can invalidate an access token on the Authorization Server, and disable it from further access to the Resource Server.

SAML provides a simpler and more standardized solution which covers all of our current and projected needs at ITILITE and avoids the use of workarounds for interoperability with native applications.

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